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This paper is a consideration of strategic aspects of national saving policies in a game
theory setting. In pure exchange economy involving two countries, each government chooses
a future time path of the national consumption-wealth ratio in order to maximize its citizens’
utility. When private time preference rates of two countries are di#erent, the government of
the country with the lower time preference rate has an incentive to slow down the national
asset accumulation. The government of the higher time preference rate country has an
incentive to slow down the national asset reduction. In Cournot-Nash equilibria of this
dynamic game, international capital ﬂows are depressed as compared with competitive
equilibria, which are Pareto-optimal. It is shown that the governments achieve the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium path of consumption-wealth ratio using a set of taxes and subsidies. A large
country intervenes into the market more than a small one. In this sense, a large country
exploits a small one. Dynamics of world interest rates are also analyzed.
Key words: Dynamic Game, International Lending, Intertemporal Terms of Trade
JEL Classiﬁcation: D91, F34
I. Introduction
As global integration of national ﬁnancial markets advances, international aspects of
saving and investment policies become more important. To solve the current account deﬁcit
problem, the United States is advised to reform its saving restraining tax system. The new
Japanese consumption tax is sometimes criticized for its encouraging e#ect on savings and
current accounts. In integrated and interdependent ﬁnancial markets, there is no assurance
that each country’s self-seeking savings policies attain globally Pareto-optimal allocation.
International aspects of saving and investment policies, despite their importance, have not
been analyzed within a convincing theoretical framework.
1 As the above two examples show,
 I thank Professor Koichi Hamada and Professor Nouriel Roubini for their helpful comments.
1 Hamada (1965) studies this problem within a framework of a two country growth model with perfect capital
mobility. Only a steady state is analyzed. He shows that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the savings policy game
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 45 (2004), pp.47-66.  Hitotsubashi Universitythe ordinary arguments seems to be based partly on the dubious presumption that current
account imbalances are undesirable and all countries had better coordinate their policies to
reduce current account imbalances. This presumption seems to contradict the common sense
of microeconomics and policy game theory. In the international trade theory, it is well-known
that each country’s self-seeking trade policies result in shrinking international trade. Because
international capital ﬂows are exchanges of present goods for future goods, it seems that
capital ﬂows are undesirably reduced in non-cooperative equilibria. If the world economy
tends to fall into such non-cooperative equilibria, then the cooperative equilibrium will be
achieved by amplifying current account imbalances.
In this paper this point is illustrated within the framework of a two-country dynamic
game model with inﬁnite time horizon consumers. Each government decides on a time path of
a national consumption-wealth ratio as a strategic variable in order to maximize its citizens’
welfare. The present study is an application of strategic analysis of international interdepend-
ence.
2 In contrast to usual studies of policy games on current account balances,
3 this model
has a microeconomic foundation of the policy target.
It will be shown that uncoordinated actions by national governments are most likely to
result in shrinking international capital ﬂows. Countries with low savings and current account
deﬁcits have an incentive to tax private consumption or subsidize private saving in order to
restrain international borrowing. By restraining borrowing, they can bring down world
interest rates and improve their intertemporal terms of trade. Countries with high savings and
current account surpluses have an incentive to introduce capital income tax or subsidize
private consumption in order to restrain saving and consequently cut down capital outﬂows
and bring up world interest rates.
Because our main concern is with the transition process of international capital ﬂows, the
dynamics of the model are analyzed not by taking a linear approximation around the steady
state but by solving nonlinear dynamic equations globally. For this purpose, a drastically
simple model is used. First, production is entirely exogenous; the output of consumption goods
is constant. There is one consumption good and one production factor. Although the
production factor is immovable, the consumption goods and ownership claim to the produc-
tion factor is traded internationally. Second, international capital ﬂows take place because of
the di#erence between two countries’ time preference rates, each of which is assumed to be
constant. In this case, the country with the higher time preference rate uses up assets while the
country with the lower rate accumulates assets continuously in competitive equilibria.
4
in a steady state is Pareto-optimal. A similar model is studied by Ohyama (1989). As in Hamada (1965), only a
steady state is analyzed. In spite of several microeconomic reﬁnements, Ohyama (1989) gets fundamentally the
same results as Hamada (1965). It is nevertheless premature to conclude that there is no need for international
policy coordination of national savings policies. We do not know about process of transition to the steady state. In
the transition process, national governments may have an incentive to exploit their oligopolistic power on world
interest rates. The present paper focuses on this problem.
2 See Cooper (1985), Hamada (1986), Buiter and Marston (1986), and Turnovsky et al. (1988).
3 For example, in Oudiz and Sachs (1984) the current account goal for the United States is taken to be zero
and for Germany and Japan to be 2 percent of GNP. They do not present any basis for this assumption.
4 This phenomenon has usually been analyzed in a context of a closed economy with heterogeneous consumers.
The divergence was originally pointed out by Ramsey (1928) and rigorously analyzed by Becker (1980). Becker
(1980) did not explicitly solve the dynamics of asset holding and interest rates. If time preference rated depend on
the instantaneous utility level (see Koopmans et al., 1965, and Uzawa, 1968), then heterogeneous consumers
coexist in the long-run. For details, see Fukao and Hamada (1989). Constant time preference rates are assumed
here because of the di$culty of analyzing dynamic games with variable time preference rates.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June .2Thanks to these simpliﬁcations, the dynamic system is solved globally and explicit time paths
for each countries’ savings, world interest rates, and other variables are derived. Such paths in
Cournot-Nash equilibria will be compared with those in cooperative equilibria.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. The next section presents
the model and studies dynamics of competitive equilibria with no government intervention. In
section three, the dynamic game between two countries is studied with the assumption that
each government decided on a time path of a national consumption-wealth ratio as a strategic
variable in order to maximize its citizens’ welfare. It will be shown that competitive equilibria
are Pareto-optimal and that Cournot-Nash equilibrium are suboptimal. In Cournot-Nash
equilibria, the amount of international lending is smaller than the socially optimal level.
In market economies, governments can not directly control the national consumption-
wealth ratio. In section four, it is shown that each government can accomplish the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium time path of consumption-wealth ratio by using a natural set of taxes and
subsidies. In the ﬁnal section, the implications of this analysis and possible extensions of it are
summarized.
II. The Model
Though the main concern of this paper is with dynamic games of national saving policies,
it is convenient to begin with an analysis of competitive equilibria with no government
intervention.
Consider a world with two countries, one consumption good, and one production factor.
We assume that production is entirely “exogenous”; there is no possibility of a#ecting the
output of consumption goods and the existing amount of the production factor. One unit of the
consumption goods is produced from one unit of the production factor each period. There is
one unit of the production factor in the world. K K unit is located in the home country. 1K K is
located in the foreign country. The production factor is immovable between the countries.
Ownership to this production factor is determined in a competitive stock market. One
equity share corresponds to one unit of the production factor and earns each period one unit
of the consumption goods as a dividend. The equity shares and the consumption goods are
traded internationally without cost. Let qt denote the price of the equity shares measured by
the consumption goods at time t. We assume that consumers anticipate the future path of qt
exactly.
Let rt denotes the real rate of return of the equity shares measured by the consumption







If there is a loan market, arbitrage will equalizes the instantaneous real interest rate with rt.
Therefore we regard rt as the instantaneous interest rate.
The population of each country stays constant. Let At denote the number of equity shares
owned by citizens in the home country at time t. At also denotes the income of the home
country, because one equity share earns one unit of consumption goods as a dividend. The
2004] HIG6I:<>8 6HE:8IH D; >CI:GC6I>DC6A A:C9>C< 6C9 7DGGDL>C< .3citizens in the home country are endowed with A A0 shares of the equity at time 0.
















where b denotes the time preference rate of the representative individual in the home country.
We assume b is positive. Ct denotes home country’s real consumption. At denotes both the
home country’s wealth and the dividend income.
Because our main concern is in the transition process, the dynamics of the model are
analyzed not by taking a linear approximation around the steady state but by solving nonlinear
dynamic equations globally. To get a manageable dynamics, we need to assume a log linear
instantaneous utility function.
5
The necessary and su$cient conditions
6 for the optimal behavior are (1), (2), non-





























where (4) and (5) are transversality conditions. The Euler equation (3) implies that optimal





















In this case, Ct depends not only on At but also on the whole future time path of the interest rate. And we do not
obtain a simple relationship between wealth and consumption like equation (6).
6 See Arrow-Kurz (1970) page 49.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June /*consumption ﬂuctuates according to the di#erence between the real interest rate and the time
preference rate. To understand the equation (3) intuitively, we transform it into
C « tbrt,( 3 )
where the circumﬂex accent denotes the growth rate of the variable. Di#erentiating instanta-
neous utility regarding time, we can ascertain that the left-hand side of the above equation
denotes the marginal rate of substitution between the consumption at time t and the
consumption at time tdt. On the right-hand side, rt denotes the relative price of consumption
goods at time t and time tdt. For competitive individuals, the optimal behavior is to equalize
their marginal rate of substitution with the market price rt. As we shall see later, for national
governments the optimal condition is di#erent from (3) because of their oligopolistic power.
From the budget constraint (1), the Euler Equation (3), and the transversality condition
(5), we obtain a consumption function, which relates domestic consumption and the wealth:
CtbqtAt,( 6 )
This consumption function also satisﬁes the other conditions of optimality. Individuals keep
their consumption-wealth ratio equal to their time preference rate. Substituting the optimal
consumption (6) into the budget constraint (1) yields a dynamic equation of the number of
equity shares that are owned by the home country:
A « t 1
qt
b,( 7 )








b*t ln C* t dt,
subject to
 A* t 1
qt
(A* tC* t), (1*)




where C* t denotes real consumption of the foreign country. A* t denotes both the foreign
country’s wealth and the dividend income. b* is the time preference rate of the foreign
representative citizen. b* can be di#erent from b.
In the same way as the home country case, a fundamental relationship between foreign
consumption and wealth can be written as
C* tb*qtA* t.( 6 *)
The dynamic equation of the foreign country’s equity shares is derived from (1*) and (6*):
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qt
b*.( 7 *)
We consider here the competitive equilibria of our model. There are two markets, a
consumption goods market and a stock market. The equilibrium condition of the consumption
goods market is
CtC* t1. (8)
The equilibrium condition of the stock market is
AtA* t1. (9)
Because of Walras’s law, one of the two equations is redundant.
Now, we solve the di#erential equations. Owing to the simpliﬁcation of the production
and the assumption of log linear utility functions, global and explicit solution can be derived.
First, we derive the solution of each country’s wealth. Subtracting (7*) from (7) and










From initial conditions (2), (2*), the equilibrium condition of the stock market (9), and the







The foreign country has 1At shares.
The dynamics of the equity share holding depend on the time preference rates of the two
countries. If the time preference rates are identical, the two countries’ asset and consumption
levels will stay constant.
7 If the time preference rates are di#erent, divergence will occur. The
country with the lower time preference rate accumulates equity shares continuously and ﬁnally
obtains all the equity shares in the world. As the budget constraints (1) and (1*) indicate, the
increase in one country’s share holding means that that country saves a positive amount. In the
foregoing process, the country with the lower time preference rate saves positive amount. And
the country with the higher time preference rate always dissaves.
Let bt denote the net foreign asset of the home country. The net foreign asset is equal to
the di#erence between the national wealth of the home country and the amount of the







b*t K K. (11)
If the time preference rate of the home country is smaller than that of the foreign country, the
7 If tax rates or ﬁscal expenditures are changed over time, then the private consumption level ﬂuctuates even in
this case. See Frenkel and Razin (1987).
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June /,net foreign asset of the home country increases continuously, which means that the home
country continues to have a current account surplus.
The equilibrium equity share price can be derived from the two countries’ consumption










The equilibrium equity share price is equal to the weighed harmonic average of the reciprocal
of the two countries’ time preference rates. The weights are the two countries’ wealth shares
in the world.











The equilibrium interest rate is equal to the weighted average of the time preference rates of
the two countries. The weights are the two countries’ consumption shares in the world.
The solutions of the two countries’ consumption expenditure can be derived from (10),















b*t.( 1 4 *)
The country with the lower preference rate consumes a relatively small amount at ﬁrst. As it
accumulates the wealth, it comes to consume more.
III. The Policy Game
In this section, the dynamic game between the two countries is analyzed. Let xt and x* t
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national consumption-wealth ratio as a strategic variable in order to maximize the utility of its
representative citizen.
8 In section four, it will be shown that each government can control its
national consumption-wealth ratio using a set of taxes and subsidies.
If the governments choose a time path of some other ratio as a strategic variable (for
example, a saving-wealth ratio or some tax rate), then the character of Cournot-Nash
equilibria will di#er from the following result. This arbitrariness is well known as Bertrand’s
Critique. Notice that some seemingly plausible variables are not appropriate for use as a
strategic variable in our model. For example, we can not take a time path of consumption as
a strategic variable. The world output of consumption goods is constant and equal to one.
Therefore the two countries can not decide their consumption level independently. By the
same reason, we can not use a path of saving-income ratio as a strategic variable as in Hamada
(1965). We shall discuss this problem further in section four.
Under the equilibrium condition of the consumption market (10), the equity share price






The more the two countries increase their consumption-wealth ratios, the cheaper the
equity shares become. The home country’s consumption level in competitive equilibrium is






The budget constraint of the home country under the policy game can be derived from the
equation (15), the deﬁnition of xt, and the budget constraint of the home country (1):
 AtAt(1At)(x* txt). (17)
(17) is a transition equation of the system.
The one unit increase of the consumption-wealth ratio xt costs a proportional decrease of
 At as the equation (17) denotes. By the one unit increase of xt, how much the home country
can expand the consumption level? As the equation (16) indicates, it depends on the two
countries’ consumption-wealth ratios, xt and x* t .I fx* t is zero, then the home country will not
be able to expand the consumption level by increasing xt. In this case, the increase of xt causes
only a proportional decrease of the equity share price. The greater the foreign country’s
consumption-wealth ratio x* t, and the smaller the xt, the less expensive the home country’s
consumption becomes. As we shall see later, this duopolistic character of the market makes
8 It is assumed that at the initial date each government must take a binding commitment regarding the policies
it will take at all future dates. Another possible approach is to model governments as choosing decision rule
strategies instead of path strategies. That is, governments are assumed to observe the values of relevant state
variables and respond instantaneously by choosing their current actions. For detail, see Basar and Olsder (1982),
Reinganum and Stokey (1985), and Turnovsky et al. (1988). In dynamic game models with decision rule strate-
gies, the players’ time horizon is usually assumed to be ﬁnite. And non-cooperative equilibria are found by using
backward induction. It seems inappropriate to assume ﬁnite time horizon in the saving policy problem. For
decision rule strategies with inﬁnite time horizon, see Oudiz and Sachs (1985).
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June /.each government behave in a strategic way.
The government of the home country chooses a time path of the consumption-wealth
ratio xt in order to maximize its citizens’ welfare. We assume that the home country
government regards the time path of the foreign consumption-wealth ratio as given and that
the foreign country government takes the symmetrical view with respect to the home country
government’s actions. That is, we analyze non-cooperative open loop solutions of our policy
game.












 AtAt(1At)(x* txt), (17)




The current-value Hamiltonian can be written as





where the costate variable qt denotes the current value of the marginal contribution of the state




max Y(At, xt, qt, t)
is a concave function of At for given qt and t, the necessary and su$cient conditions for the






















Eliminating qt from (18) and (19) and arranging the result with (15) and (17), we obtain
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x ˆ tx ˆ * t(xtx* t)(xt «x* t)bxtx* t. (22)
In order to understand the meaning of the above equation, we rearrange it into an equation of
Ctand C* t. Substituting the deﬁnitions of xt and x* t, (15) and (17) into (22) yields
C « tbrtC «* t. (23)
This necessary condition of optimality, (23) corresponds to the equation (3), which is a
necessary condition of the optimal behavior of the home country citizens in the competitive
market. On the right-hand side of (23), there is a new term, which denotes the growth rate of
the foreign consumption.
An intuitive argument goes as follows. Like (3), the left hand side of the equation (23)
denotes the marginal rate of substitution for the home country between consumption at time
t and consumption at time tdt. The right hand side of the equation (23) denotes the marginal
cost of consumption at time t measured by consumption at time tdt. From the equation (16),
we know that if the foreign consumption increases over time, then the marginal cost of the
future consumption will become cheaper for the home country relative to the present
consumption. Because of this e#ect, the marginal cost di#ers from the market price rt. Notice
that this e#ect makes the home country’s consumption move more closely to the foreign
country’s consumption than in the competitive equilibria.
The conditions of the optimal behavior of the home country government will now be
summarized. The necessary and su$cient conditions are the nonnegativity conditions of xt and
At, the budget constraint (17), the equation (22), and transversality conditions. Substituting















The government of the foreign country chooses a time path of the consumption-wealth
ratio x* t in order to maximize the utility of its representative citizen. The government of the















 AtAt(1At)(x* txt), (17)
A0A A0,( 2 )
x* t0,
and
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Like the home country case, the necessary and su$cient conditions of the optimal
behavior of the foreign country are the budget constraint (17), the nonnegativity conditions of
x* t,1 At,
















As in the home country case, the equation (22*) can be arranged into
C «* tb*rtC « t,( 2 3 *)
Time paths of xt, x* t,a n dAt in Cournot-Nash equilibria are determined by the budget
constraint (17); the equation (22) and (22*); the transversality conditions (20), (21), (20*),
and (21*); the non-negativity conditions of xt, x* t, At and 1At; and the initial condition (2).
Time paths of Ct, C* t and qt are determined by the equilibrium time paths of xt, x* t, and At;
equation (15); and the deﬁnitions of xt,a n dx* t.
Without solving the dynamic system, the interest rate and the equity share price in







The interest rate and the equity share price are constant in equilibria. The constant interest
rate will be studied further in section four.
Because it is di$cult to solve the nonlinear di#erential equation (17), (22), and (22*)
directly, we rearrange the equilibrium conditions. Substituting the deﬁnitions of xt, x* t into the
preceding conditions of Cournot-Nash equilibria and using (15), the equilibrium conditions of






































A0A A0.( 2 )
The above conditions are equivalent to the preceding conditions of xt, x* t and At. From
































.( 2 9 *)
In Cournot-Nash equilibria the country with the lower time preference rate increases its
consumption over time and the country with the higher time preference rate decreases its
consumption in a way similar to that in equilibria. But the divergence speed of the two
countries’ consumption are di#erent in the two cases. From (14) and (14*) we know that the
gap between the growth rates of the two countries’ consumption levels is bb* in competitive
equilibria. In the policy game, the gap is (bb*)/2. This slowdown of the divergence comes
from the second terms on the right-hand side of (23) and (23*). As we have discussed the
meaning of the equation (23), each country has an incentive to move its consumption more
closely to the other country’s consumption in the duopolistic situation.
The initial consumption level of the home country C0 is determined in the following way.


















C0 is determined by this equation. C0 is uniquely determined and satisﬁes 0C01 under a
given A A0, which satisﬁes 0A A01. C0 increases as A A0 increases.
In the same way as (30), we get a relationship between the home country’s wealth and its
consumption at time t:









































If the time preference rates are identical, the two countries’ asset and consumption levels will
stay constant. And the two countries’ consumption shares, Ct and C* t are equal to their initial
endowment shares, A0 and A* 0. That is, if bb*, then the resource allocation in the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium will be identical with that in the competitive market. As we shall see later,
the competitive equilibrium is Pareto-optimal. Therefore, there is no need for policy coordina-
tion in this case.
If the time preference rate of the home country b is smaller than that of the foreign
country b*, the home country’s equity share At will increase as time elapses. As seen later, the
speed of increase is slower than that in competitive equilibria.
It is not di$cult to conﬁrm that the time paths of Ct and C* t and At, deﬁned by (29), (29*),
(30), and (32), satisfy all the conditions of Cournot-Nash equilibria, which we have summa-
rized. Therefore, these time paths are Cournot-Nash equilibrium paths.


























































The consumption-wealth ratio of the foreign country can be derived in the same way.
The solution (33) implies the following strategy of the home country government. If the
time preference rate of the home country is higher than that of the foreign country, the home
country will decreases its consumption-wealth ratio as time elapses. This ratio ﬁnally ap-
proaches to b as t. In competitive equilibria, the consumption-wealth ratio of the home
country is always b, as the consumption function (6) indicates. In Cournot-Nash equilibria the
higher time preference country comes to behave like a price-taker as its economic share
decreases.
In contrast, if the time preference rate of the home country is lower than that of the
foreign country, then the home country will increase its consumption-wealth ratio as time
2004] HIG6I:<>8 6HE:8IH D; >CI:GC6I>DC6A A:C9>C< 6C9 7DGGDL>C< /3elapses. This ratio ﬁnally approaches to (bb*)/2. The lower time preference country does
not behave like a price-taker even after it obtains almost all the wealth of the world. It
continues to exploit the other country. This result depends on our assumption that production
is entirely exogenous. If production is endogenous, then government intervention in private
savings will causes a harmful side e#ect: the intervention will cause the marginal productivity
of capital to deviate from the time preference rate. As the lower time preference country
increases its wealth and consumption, the beneﬁt from the exploitation of the other country
diminishes. But the harmful side e#ect remains. Therefore the government will reduce its
intervention after obtains almost all the wealth of the world.
The relationship between the consumption and the equity share holding in Cournot-Nash
equilibria is compared with that in competitive equilibria (Figure 1). The time preference rate
of the home country is assumed to be lower than that of the foreign country. The dotted curve
is the locus of the home country’s consumption and equity shares in Cournot-Nash equilibria.
This relationship is deﬁned by the equation (31). The solid curve is the locus of the home
country’s consumption and equity shares in competitive equilibria. This relationship is deﬁned
by the equation (14). In both cases, 1Ct and 1At denote the foreign country’s consumption
and equity shares respectively. The two curves are upward sloping and upward concave.
9 On
9 In the case of competitive equilibria, this is obvious from the equation (14). In the case of Cournot-Nash
equilibria, the upward sloping is obvious from the equation (31). We can conﬁrm the concavity by di#erentiating
the equation (31). Di#erentiating the equation (31) twice yields
F><.1 .
Figure 1. The dynamics of the home country’s consumption and assets.
(The time preference rate of the home country is assumed to be lower than
that of the foreign country)
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June 0*the 45line, the home country’s consumption Ct is equal to its income At. The two curves are
located below the 45line. It indicates that the home country, which is assumed to have the
lower time preference rate, continuously accumulates equity shares in both equilibria.
The curve of competitive equilibrium is located below the curve of Cournot-Nash
equilibria (Figure 1), which can be conﬁrmed in the following way.
Assume one consumption level C
0
t at time t.L e tA
N
t denotes the amount of equity shares
that brings the home country to consume C
0
t in Cournot-Nash equilibria. Let A
M
t denotes the
amount of equity shares that brings the home country to consume C
0
t in competitive equilibria.









































































































t is positive under conditions, bb*,
A
M
t 1, and A
M
t 0. It is shown that the curve of competitive equilibria is located below the
curve of Cournot-Nash equilibria.
At the home country’s given equity shares At, the home country, which is assumed to have
the lower time preference rate, consumes Ct in the competitive equilibrium and consumes C t in
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (Figure 1). By consuming more, the home country can bring
down the equity share price measured by the consumption goods. The lower equity price
means that the lender country can acquire the equity share in exchange for a lesser amount of
the consumption goods. On the other hand, the country with the higher time preference rate
has an incentive to consume less than what it consumes in the competitive equilibrium.



































If b	b*, then d2At/dC2
t0.
It is shown that the curve of Cournot-Nash equilibria in Figure 1 is upward concave.
2004] HIG6I:<>8 6HE:8IH D; >CI:GC6I>DC6A A:C9>C< 6C9 7DGGDL>C< 0+preference country grows more slowly in Cournot-Nash equilibria than in competitive equi-
libria. The two arrows of di#erent length in Figure 1 indicate this.
As the equation (11) indicates, the net foreign asset is equal to the di#erence between the
national wealth of the home country and the amount of the production factor that is located
in the home country. Because the location of the production factor is constant in our model,
the net foreign asset of the home country moves in parallel with the national wealth of the
home country. Therefore the net foreign asset of the lower time preference country grows
more slowly in Cournot-Nash equilibria than in competitive equilibria; this means that the
current account imbalance, which is equal to the international capital ﬂow, is smaller in
Cournot-Nash equilibria than in the competitive equilibria. The uncoordinated actions by the
national governments result in shrinking international lending and borrowing.
In the international trade theory, it is well known that each country’s self-seeking trade
policies result in shrinking international trade. Keeping in mind that international capital ﬂows
are international exchanges of present goods for future goods, we see that the present analysis
is a natural extension of standard trade theory.
Because there is no market distortion, the allocation in competitive equilibria is Pareto-
optimal, which can be conﬁrmed by comparing the consumption paths of competitive


















where w denotes the weight given to the home country consumers by the central planner. If
wb*A A0/(b*A A0b(1A A0))}, then the solutions of the social optimization problem will
become identical with the path of the foregoing competitive equilibrium. As compared with the
socially optimal path, the consumption of expenditures of the two countries diverge more
slowly in Cournot-Nash equilibria.
10
IV. Tax Policies in Cournot-Nash Equilibria
In a market economy, government cannot directly determine the national saving ratio.
But the saving ratio can be controlled with appropriate tax policies. As shown in this section,
each government can accomplish the foregoing Cournot-Nash equilibrium time path of
consumption-wealth ratio by using a set of taxes and subsidies. Strictly, there is tax policies, by
which each country can accomplish the consumption-wealth ration path (33) of Cournot-
10 It is not di$cult to conﬁrm that both countries can improve their welfare simultaneously by deviating their
consumption paths appropriately from the Cournot-Nash paths.
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Assume that the home country government levies a capital income tax on its residents.
11
Let tt denotes the tax rate at time t. tt can be negative. The negative tax rate tt denotes that the
government is subsidizing asset holding. The government is assumed to impose the tax purely
for reallocation purposes and reimburse the revenue to the public in a lump-sum fashion.




where Tt denotes the reimbursement. The budget constraint of the government can be written
as
TtttqtAt (35)
















The consumption-wealth ratio of the competitive citizens in the home country can be














Notice that the consumption-wealth ratio of the competitive citizens does not depend on the
foreign strategy {x* t } nor on any market conditions. It is not di$cult to ascertain that if the



















then the consumption-wealth ratio path of the competitive citizens (37) will become identical
with the optimal strategy of the home country in Cournot-Nash equilibrium (33).
The equation (38) indicates that if the home country’s time preference rate is lower than
that of the foreign country, then the home country will accomplish the optimal consumption-
saving path by taxing the domestic citizens’ asset holding. Under the capital income tax, the
home country citizens consume more as compared with the discretionary case.
In the same way, it can be shown that the foreign government can accomplish the optimal
strategy (33*) by controlling its capital income tax as
11 As is well known, capital income taxes and consumption taxes are sometimes equivalent. In this model,
governments can achieve the optimal consumption-wealth ratio path not only by using capital income taxes but
also by using consumption taxes.

















,( 3 8 *)
where t* t denotes the tax rate in the foreign country at time t.
The tax policies of the two countries in Cournot-Nash equilibrium are compared in Figure
2. The time preference rate of the home country is assumed to be lower than that of the foreign
country. Notice that the di#erence between the two countries’ after-tax interest rates is
constant over time. The di#erence is always (b*b)/2. In Cournot-Nash equilibria of this
model, the relative size of the two countries will not a#ect the magnitude of the market
distortion if the market distortion is measured by the interest di#erential between the two
countries. The higher time preference country comes to behave like a price-taker as its
economic share decreases (Figure 2). In contrast, the lower time preference country intensiﬁes
its intervention into the market as its economic share increases. In this sense, a large country
exploits a small one.
F><.2 .
Figure 2. The dynamics of interest rates, tax rates, and subsidy rates in the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium: the capital income tax case. (The time preference rate
of the home country b is assumed to be lower than that of the foreign country b*.)
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By introducing a theory of non-cooperative dynamic games into the international lending
and borrowing problem, it is seen that each country’s self-seeking savings policies produce
suboptimal allocation in the transition process. In Cournot-Nash equilibria of this policy game,
governments of high time preference countries depress private consumption by, for example,
subsidizing asset holding. By depressing consumption, they can bring down the world interest
rate and improve their intertemporal terms of trade. Governments of low time preference
countries boost private consumption by, for example, taxing asset holdings. As a result,
international capital ﬂows shrink to an undesirable level Cournot-Nash equilibria. If the world
economy tends to fall into such non-cooperative equilibria, the cooperative equilibria, the
cooperative equilibrium will be achieved by amplifying current account imbalances.
The world interest rate also moves di#erently as compared with that in competitive
equilibria. In competitive equilibria, the world interest rate is equal to the weighted average of
the two countries’ time preference rates. And the weights are equal to each country’s
consumption shares in the world. As the lower time preference country expands its consump-
tion share over time, the world interest rate falls. In Cournot-Nash equilibria, the world
interest rate stays constant, because the government of the lower time preference country
intensiﬁes its capital income tax rate and continues to exploit the higher time preference
country.
Some qualiﬁcation as well as generalization of the above results may be noted. First, the
story becomes more involved, if the opportunity for physical investment is introduced. Assume
that the production function has constant returns to scale and is identical in both countries.
There is only one production factor, capital stock. The capital stock and consumption goods
are identical. In this case, the governments have no incentive to introduce savings policy,
because they can not a#ect the world interest rate, which is always equal to the constant
marginal productivity of capital. The non-cooperative equilibrium becomes identical with the
competitive equilibrium. Probably the real economy lies between the two extreme cases, the
constant output case and the constant marginal productivity case.
Secondly, it is possible that other formulations of governments’ strategy spaces bring
about di#erent non-cooperative equilibria. For example, it will be fruitful to compare the case
of territorial principle taxation,
12 in which the domestic government taxes investment income
from domestic assets regardless of who invested in them, with the case of nationality principle
taxation, in which the government taxes domestic residents’ investment income regardless of
where the income is derived. Another possible approach is to model governments as choosing
decision rule strategies instead of path strategies.
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